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 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 10-4487 
 ___________ 
 
 JIAN YONG YANG, 
        Petitioner 
 
 v. 
 
 ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
 Board of Immigration Appeals 
 (Agency No. A89-253-397) 
 Immigration Judge:  Honorable Susan G. Roy 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
June 16, 2011 
Before:  FUENTES, VANASKIE AND ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 
 (Opinion filed:  August 22, 2011) 
 ___________ 
 
 OPINION 
 ___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Jian Yong Yang seeks review of a final order of removal.  For the reasons that 
follow, we will deny the petition for review. 
I. 
 Petitioner Jian Yong Yang (“Yang”) is a native and citizen of China.  He entered 
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the United States at an unknown place in July 2007, and conceded eligibility for removal.  
He applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention 
Against Torture (“CAT”), predicated on his fear of persecution based on his membership 
in an underground Christian church, which the Chinese government prohibits.  At his 
immigration hearing, Yang testified that the church members worshipped in constantly-
changing locations in order to avoid detection.  Yang stated that on April 22, 2007, he 
was worshiping at a member‟s house.  Armed police burst in and arrested Yang and his 
father; other members were able to escape.  He was interrogated at a police station, 
beaten, and held in custody for nineteen days.  To obtain his release, he signed a letter 
guaranteeing that he would not participate in church activities.  He eventually resumed 
active church membership.  Yang admitted that he was never contacted or harassed again 
by the police.  He continues to practice his religion in the United States.  He stated that he 
is afraid that, if returned to China, the government will persecute him.  He also fears that 
he will be fined and jailed because he was illegally smuggled out of the country.   
The Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denied asylum relief, finding that Yang was not 
credible.  The IJ took issue with Yang‟s story that an acquaintance of his was fined and 
jailed for having been smuggled out of the country.  Yang mentioned this woman for the 
first time during his testimony; he did not include any information about her experience 
in his asylum application, and provided no corroboration.  The IJ noted that it took Yang 
approximately six months to join a church after arriving in the United States, and rejected 
his explanation that his family members were too busy to help him.  The IJ especially 
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took issue with Yang‟s failure to present testimony or a letter from his sister, who has 
status and who has allegedly seen him go to church.  Finally, the IJ faulted Yang for 
failing to provide documentary evidence of his church membership or of his arrest, 
detention, or guarantee letter.  The IJ concluded that Yang had not demonstrated past 
persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution, and that Yang failed to meet the 
burden of proof for withholding of removal or CAT relief. 
 The Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) determined that the IJ‟s adverse 
credibility decision was not erroneous, and also found that Yang had not met his burden 
of proof under any of the applicable standards.  Yang filed a timely petition for review.  
II. 
 We have jurisdiction to review a final order of removal under 8 U.S.C.                   
§ 1252(a)(1).  See Abdulai v. Ashcroft, 239 F.3d 542, 547 (3d Cir. 2001).  Where, as 
here, the BIA adopts the findings of the IJ and discusses some of the bases for the IJ‟s 
opinion, this Court will review both opinions.  See Xie v. Ashcroft, 359 F.3d 239, 242 
(3d Cir. 2004).  We review factual findings, including adverse credibility determinations, 
for substantial evidence, see Butt v. Gonzales, 429 F.3d 430, 433 (3d Cir. 2005), 
upholding them “unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to 
the contrary.”  8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); see also Dia v. Ashcroft, 353 F.3d 228, 262 (3d 
Cir. 2003) (en banc).  Because Yang filed his asylum application after the enactment of 
the REAL ID Act, the inconsistencies, inaccuracies, or falsehoods upon which the 
adverse credibility finding is based need not go to the heart of his claims.  See 8 U.S.C. § 
4 
 
1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); Lin v. Att‟y Gen., 543 F.3d 114, 119 n.5 (3d Cir. 2008).  Rather, the 
REAL ID Act permits credibility determinations to be based on observations of his 
demeanor, the plausibility of his story, and the consistency of his statements.  8 U.S.C. § 
1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). 
III. 
 Yang claims that the adverse credibility finding is not supported by substantial 
evidence.  The BIA upheld the IJ‟s finding based on Yang‟s failure to mention in his 
asylum application his acquaintance who had been fined, jailed, and beaten for having 
been illegally smuggled out of China, and for his failure to provide any testimony from 
his sister.
1
  Yang explains that his knowledge of his acquaintance‟s experience was 
second-hand, that he could not contact her, and that the issue was not central to his case 
of persecution.  The BIA‟s reliance on the discrepancy between his asylum application 
and his testimony regarding his acquaintance‟s story is reasonable, given that his 
application is based in part on his fear of future persecution for having illegally departed 
China.    
The IJ‟s and BIA‟s reliance on Yang‟s failure to corroborate his claims with a 
letter or testimony from his sister goes more to the heart of his asylum claim, rather than 
his credibility.  We have found that “an applicant for asylum must provide reliable 
evidence to corroborate testimony when it is reasonable [to do so] and there is no 
                                                 
1
 We agree with the BIA that it is not implausible that Yang would be unable to 
provide proof of his membership or even of the existence of his church in China, 
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satisfactory explanation for its absence.”  Sandie v. Att‟y Gen., 562 F.3d 246, 252 (3d 
Cir. 2009).  Accordingly, denial of relief may be predicated on a failure to corroborate 
when: “(1) the IJ identifies facts for which it is reasonable to expect the applicant to 
produce corroboration, (2) the applicant fails to corroborate, and (3) the applicant fails to 
adequately explain the failure.”  Chukwu v. Att‟y Gen., 484 F.3d 185, 191-92 (3d Cir. 
2007) (citing Abdulai, 239 F.3d at 554).  In this case, the IJ followed the proper line of 
inquiry regarding Yang‟s failure to provide corroboration, although it appears the IJ and 
BIA conflated that failure with a lack of credibility. 
In any event, the IJ and BIA found that even if Yang‟s testimony was to be 
believed, he had failed to meet his burden of proof for asylum.  To establish eligibility for 
asylum, Yang must demonstrate either past persecution or a well-founded fear of future 
persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social 
group, or political opinion.  See Vente v. Gonzales, 415 F.3d 296, 300 (3d Cir. 2005).  
“[P]ersecution connotes extreme behavior, including „threats to life, confinement, torture, 
and economic restrictions so severe that they constitute a threat to life or freedom.‟”  
Ahmed v. Ashcroft, 341 F.3d 214, 217 (3d Cir. 2003).  It does not include “isolated 
incidents that do not result in serious injury.”  Voci v. Gonzales, 409 F. 3d 607, 614-15 
(3d Cir. 2005).   
Yang argues that he suffered persecution when he was arrested, beaten, and 
detained for nineteen days for practicing his religion.  By his own account, the beating 
                                                                                                                                                             
give its unauthorized and underground status. 
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lasted approximately one minute and he did not sustain serious injuries or require medical 
attention.  The IJ and BIA determined that Yang‟s physical mistreatment, as described, 
and his nineteen-day detention did not rise to the level of persecution.  We agree.  See 
Chen v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 221, 223, 234-35 (3d Cir. 2004) (beating with sticks by 
Chinese officials did not constitute persecution where petitioner never required medical 
attention), and Kibinda v. Att‟y Gen., 477 F.3d 113, 119-20 (3d Cir. 2007) (a single 
detention and beating requiring stitches did not rise to the level of persecution). 
We also find that the evidence in the record supports the IJ‟s and BIA‟s conclusion 
that Yang failed to demonstrate a well-founded fear of future persecution on account of 
his religion.  Yang continued to practice his religion in China for months after signing the 
guarantee letter and no harm came to him.  Likewise, his father and friend who were also 
arrested with him continued to practice without any consequence.  He testified that he has 
no indication that the police are looking for him or have any interest in him.   
Finally, substantial evidence supports the IJ‟s and BIA‟s determination that Yang 
failed to show a well-founded fear of persecution because he left China illegally.  The 
BIA properly noted that prosecution for illegal departure does not qualify a person for 
asylum.  There is insufficient evidence to show that persons repatriated to China after 
illegal departure face torture or persecution.  See, e.g., Wang v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 347, 
350 (3d Cir. 2004).  Accordingly, Yang has not met his burden of proof for asylum. 
As Yang has failed to meet the burden for asylum, he fails to meet the higher 
burden for withholding of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3).  See Lukwago v. 
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Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 157, 182 (3d Cir. 2003).  Likewise, the record does not support his 
claim for CAT protection.  See id. at 182-83.  Accordingly, the BIA properly denied CAT 
relief.  
IV. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will deny the petition for review.   
